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NOTES
THE POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS
DEFENSE AND FEMINISM:
MORE OR LESS JUSTICE FOR
WOMEN?t
"But for the psychosis, she would never have considered,
much less acted upon, any thought to take the lives of the
children she bore into this world and dearly loved as their
mother. "'
-Defense Attorney George Parnham
INTRODUCTION
Andrea Yates faced the death penalty for drowning her five chil-
dren in her bathtub in Houston in June 2001. The details that
emerged concerning the killings are horrific; a picture of a family
tragedy that few can imagine or understand. The police had been
called to the house the morning of the murders by the mother and
found the children, aged six months to seven years, dead in the bath-
tub and spread out in the bedroom.2 Andrea Yates had a history of
mental illness, medications, psychiatric hospitalizations, and suicide
attempts. She pled not guilty by reason of insanity, claiming that she
was suffering from postpartum psychosis when she killed her chil-
dren. With precedent as an indicator, Andrea Yates faced penalties
ranging from an acquittal to the death penalty. A jury of eight women
t Awarded the seventh annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student
Note Award, as selected by the Volume 52 Editorial Board.
I Paul Duggan, Mental Illness is Focus of Yates Jury Selection, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,
2002, at A3 (quoting Andrea Yates' defense attorney).
2 Evan Thomas, Motherhood and Murder, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 2001, at 20.
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and four men convicted Andrea Yates after just three and one-half
hours of deliberation; she was sentenced to life in prison.
3
The wide range of verdicts in similar cases indicates society's
and the legal system's ambivalence about postpartum psychosis as
a criminal defense. 4 The ambivalence results not only from soci-
ety's desire to hold people accountable, but also from the conflict
between traditional notions of motherhood and the tragedy of fili-
cide. The variety of outcomes also illustrates the difficulty that the
legal system, from judges to juries, has in adjudicating female-
specific defenses in a purportedly gender-neutral manner.
Today, the dialectic about what equality means and how best
to achieve it plays out in the courts, in legislatures, and in acade-
mia as society wrestles with the question of whether there can be
legal equality in the face of biological differences. 5 In this setting,
when the discussion of sex equality has evolved to recognizing
that, in most cases, gender differences are irrelevant, 6 the courts
and feminist groups struggle to deal with the remaining cases in
which biological differences between men and women are rele-
vant.
7
This Note explores the controversy over the use of postpartum
psychosis as a criminal defense and examines the interplay be-
tween feminists and a legal system ill-equipped to recognize and
draw lines when the question is one of gender. Part I describes the
psychiatric condition of postpartum psychosis. Part II discusses
the current insanity defense standards and recent cases in which
the postpartum psychosis defense has been used to varying degrees
of success. Part II also identifies problem areas, such as expert
testimony and medical research, that make the insanity defense in
any of its current forms inadequate for arriving at justice for
women suffering from postpartum psychosis.
Part III discusses why this female-specific defense is contro-
versial among feminists. It explains the mainstream feminist theo-
3 For a discussion of the verdict, see Richard Cohen, Are We Insane?, WASH. POST, Mar.
14, 2002, at A27, and Charles Krauthammer, Not Guilty, Insane, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2002, at
A23.
4 Daniel Maier Katkin, Postpartum Psychosis, Infanticide, and Criminal Justice, in
POSTPARTUM PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS 275 (James Alexander Hamilton & Patricia Neel Harberger
eds., 1992).
5 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,
955 (1984) ("The reality of sex-based physical differences poses a significant problem for a
society committed to ideals of individual human freedom and equality of opportunity.").
6 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (noting that "the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to [the] ability to perform or contribute to society").
7 Law, supra note 5, at 969 ("The development of constitutional doctrine in the past
fifteen years has also failed to reconcile the idea of equality with the reality of biological differ-
ence.").
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ries and their approaches to female-specific legal standards. Part
III also explores cases in which the Supreme Court has found it
permissible to make gender-based distinctions and how these deci-
sions have influenced the concept of equality for women. Finally,
Part IV argues that some feminist theories actually hinder equality
and justice in the area of biological differences. It proposes that a
legislative solution creating a separate postpartum defense is the
only way to arrive at equal justice for mothers who commit filicide
while suffering from postpartum psychosis. This legislative solu-
tion would recognize the indisputable differences between men
and women and allow for a legal standard designed specifically to
recognize the unique character and nature of this disease.
I. POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS - A PSYCHIATRIC CONDITION
Before examining cases that have employed the postpartum
psychosis defense, it is important to highlight the differences
among the "baby blues," postpartum depression, and postpartum
psychosis. This distinction is crucial to understanding why post-
partum psychosis can be singled out for different legal treatment
while the other two illnesses cannot. Based on current medical
research, postpartum psychosis is the only condition that should
qualify for special legal treatment. "Baby blues" and postpartum
depression, while medically recognized, would not meet the
threshold of legal insanity in the majority of cases because they
typically do not impair a mother's ability to tell right from wrong. 8
It is also important to emphasize, as a rebuttal to those concerned
with an overly broad insanity standard, that postpartum psychosis
is a narrowly defined medical category that includes relatively few
women.
9
The "baby blues", or "blues", occurs in fifty to seventy per-
cent of women in the first six to eight weeks after birth; symptoms
include crying, general depression, and fatigue. The "blues" does
not impair a mother's judgment and is probably not a disorder or
disease.' 0 Postpartum depression occurs in ten to twenty percent
of women and may persist for one year. It is categorized as a type
8 For a discussion of the causes of the various stages, see Kimberly Waldron, Postpartum
Psychosis as an Insanity Defense, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 669, 671-73 (1990).
9 Michael O'Hara, Post-partum "Blues," Depression, and Psychosis: A Review, 7 J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 205, 206-09 (1987). See also Brice Pit, De-
pression and Childbirth, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECrIVE DISORDERS 361, 361-72 (E.S. Paykel ed.,
1982).
10 O'Hara, supra note 9, at 206-09. For a recent study on postpartum depression and
treatments, see Katherine L. Wisner et al., Postpartum Depression, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 194
(2002).
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of reactive depression and involves feelings of hopelessness, in-
adequacy, anxiety, and moodiness.11 Although studies are few, the
level of support that the mother receives from the father and family
is more determinative of the depression than are demographic and
biological factors.
12
Postpartum psychosis occurs in one to two of every one thou-
sand births and can lead to suicide or infanticide. It involves a ma-
jor deviation from the normal processes of thinking, behavior, and
emotion. Emotional reactions may be inappropriate to the circum-
stances, and actions may not be related to facts. For example, a
mother may say that she sees the room upside down, express con-
cern that a small pimple on her child's face is a misplaced testis, or
fear that the hospital staff is part of a conspiracy to kill the baby.
13
Anxiety can lead to panic attacks; a mother often has obsessive
thoughts about harming the baby by putting it in the oven, drown-
ing it, cutting off its body parts, or dropping it from an elevated
surface. 14 Hospitalization is necessary for the protection of both
the mother and the child.' 5
Postpartum psychosis traditionally has not had its own diag-
nostic category because it has not been viewed as distinguishable
from non-postpartum psychoses.' 6  Postpartum psychosis was
thought to be the same as a psychosis that a man or a woman who
had not recently given birth suffers. However, the fact is that
women suffering from postpartum psychosis have been shown to
be more delusional, disoriented, and agitated with greater fre-
quency than men or women suffering from psychosis unrelated to
childbirth.
7
II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE AS APPLIED TO POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS
Daniel Maier Katkin studied twenty-four cases in which post-
partum psychosis was employed as a defense. Of those cases,
eight women were acquitted, four were given probation, ten were
1 O'Hara, supra note 9, at 210.
12 Id. at 214.
13 KATHARINA DALTON, DEPRESSION AFTER CHILDBIRTH 84-90 (1996). These examples
come from stories that postpartum patients shared with Dr. Dalton.
14 VERTA TAYLOR, ROCK-A-BY BABY: FEMINISM, SELF-HELP, AND POSTPARTUM DE-
PRESSION 42 (1996). See also DALTON, supra note 13, at 86 ("Characteristically there may be
sudden changes from normal lucidity to extremely bizarre actions and statements.").
15 DALTON, supra note 13, at 85.
16 O'Hara, supra note 9, at 217.
17 Id. at 218. See also Katkin, supra note 4, at 275 (stating that the occurrence of postpar-
tum violence is "not merely a few isolated incidents, but a recurring pattern of the destruction of
planned-for, wanted children by their own mothers with no apparent motive and under circum-
stances that suggest transitory mental illness").
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sentenced to between three and twenty years, and two were sen-
tenced to life in prison. 18 The disparity in outcomes indicates the
difficulty that juries have in reconciling a mother's normal behav-
ior with a sudden onset of delusional and psychotic behavior. In
addition, postpartum psychosis is difficult to prove under current
insanity defense standards because the medical community is not
in agreement about the diagnosis. As a result, expert testimony is
often confusing.
A. An Overview of Insanity Standards and Illustrative Cases
The historical premise for the insanity defense is that a defen-
dant should not be held responsible for a crime if the defendant did
not have a blameworthy state of mind at the time of committing
the act.' 9 Jurisdictions within the United States apply different
standards to determine legal sanity. The states have developed
numerous specialized legal terms to define insanity; those legal
terms differ substantially from their psychiatric counterparts. 20
The two legal standards that are currently in use are the
M'Naghten test and the American Law Institute provision (also
known as the Model Penal Code provision).
To prove insanity, the M'Naghten test requires that the defen-
dant be suffering from a defect in reason because of a disease of
the mind so that at the time of the crime the defendant did not
know the nature or quality of his act. Alternatively, if he did know
the nature or quality of his act, then he did not know that it was
wrong. 21 This test is often criticized for failing to recognize de-
grees of incapacity and for relying too heavily on expert testi-
mony. In the benchmark case of United States v. Freeman,23 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit outlined the
various deficiencies of the M'Naghten test, including that its non-
recognition of varying degrees of control is "grossly unrealistic"
18 Katkin, supra note 4, at 279-80.
19 See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
20 For further discussion of these differences, see State v. March, No. CR1866304, 2001
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1140, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2001).
21 Bernadette McSherry, The Return of the Raging Hormones Theory: Premenstrual
Syndrome, Postpartum Disorders and Criminal Responsibility, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 292, 306
(1993).
22 See, e.g., Brenda Barton, Comment, When Murdering Hands Rock the Cradle: An
Overview of America's Incoherent Treatment of Infanticidal Mothers, 51 SMU L. REV. 591,
597-98 (1998).
23 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). For further discussion, see Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon,
"Literature as Law": The History of the Insanity Plea and a Fictional Application within the
Law & Literature Canon, 72 TEMP. L. REV 381, 398 (1999).
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and that it places "tight shackles" on expert psychiatric testi-
mony.24
Both of these weaknesses in the M'Naghten test are particu-
larly detrimental to proving postpartum psychosis. First, postpar-
tum psychosis is characterized by its sudden onset and dissipation.
The mother may have varying degrees of sanity throughout the
postpartum period.25 This makes it difficult to prove whether the
mother, who generally acts normally prior to the killing, knew
right from wrong at the moment of the murder. Second, medical
experts do not agree on the causes of postpartum psychosis so that
their testimony may appear to the jury to be unreliable or inconsis-
tent. For example, in the opening to his chapter on postpartum
psychosis, Dr. Brockington states: "It would be ideal to start this
chapter with a definition, but this is one of the greatest difficul-
ties. 2 6 Thus, with even a working definition still under discus-
sion, it is difficult for defense experts to meet the stringent "dis-
ease of the mind" requirements set forth in the M'Naghten test.
The Supreme Court of Nevada followed the M'Naghten test in
Clark v. State.27 In that case, a mother was convicted of attempt-
ing to murder her two-week-old daughter by wrapping her in a
blanket and abandoning her in the bushes at the side of a road.
Two psychiatrists and one psychologist testified as to Clark's "se-
vere post partum [sic] depression" that rendered her legally insane
at the time of the abandonment. 28 However, Clark's family mem-
bers testified that she was acting normally on the day of the aban-
donment.2 9 The fact that Clark was unemotional and calm when
questioned by the police and made up a story that the child was
kidnapped weighed more heavily with the jury than did the expert
medical testimony.30
The M'Naghten test also was followed in Commonwealth v.
Comitz.3 1 In that case, the defendant drove with her one-month-old
infant to an overpass in Pennsylvania and dropped him into a
stream. She originally reported to the police that the baby was
kidnapped. The defendant had suffered postpartum depression
after the birth of her first child and was taking antidepressant
medication at the time of the murder.32 Comitz pled guilty but
24 357 F.2d at 618-19.
25 Katkin, supra note 4, at 275.
26 IAN BROCKINGTON, MOTHERHOOD AND MENTAL HEALTH 200 (1996).
27 588 P.2d 1027 (Nev. 1979).
Id. at 1029.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 530 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
32 Id. at 475.
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mentally ill to third-degree murder. The trial court accepted that
she was mentally ill but did not excuse her conduct.33 On appeal,
the Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that the "appellant's
mental condition has been the focus of attention in this matter." 34
The appellate court said that, despite the evidence of the defen-
dant's mental condition, the trial court was not required to excuse
her conduct. The sentence of eight to twenty years was affirmed.35
Despite expert testimony and the defendants' strange conduct,
neither Comitz nor Clark could meet the M'Naghten insanity stan-
dard. The fact that the mothers created kidnapping stories after the
killings weighed heavily under M'Naghten to show that they knew
right from wrong. However, since one of the characteristics of
postpartum psychosis is its sudden onset and dissipation,36 the fact
that the mother, after the killing, knew to contact the police should
not be determinative of the knowledge of right and wrong at the
time of the killing.
The American Law Institute (ALl) formulation for the insan-
ity defense is more flexible than the M'Naghten rule. The ALl
provision creates a two-prong test whereby the defendant must
prove that "as a result of mental disease or defect he lack[ed] sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law.",37 The defendant only has to prove one of the two prongs:
either that she lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of her actions, or that she could not conform her conduct to
the requirements of the law.
This formulation is favorable to criminal mothers because the
"substantial capacity" language recognizes that impairment can
come in varying degrees. By using the word "substantial" to mod-
ify "capacity," the rule differs from M'Naghten in not requiring
total incapacity. In Freeman, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit noted that the rule "reflects awareness that
from the perspective of psychiatry absolutes are ephemeral and
gradations are inevitable., 38 "Appreciate" is also a broader stan-
33 Id. Under the Pennsylvania "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, the court has discretion to
excuse the defendant's conduct based on an evaluation of mitigating factors and to impose any
sentence "which may lawfully be imposed on any defendant convicted of the same offense." 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9727 (West 2001).
34 Comitz, 530 A.2d at 474.
35 Id. at 478.
36 DALTON, supra note 13, at 84-90.
37 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962).
38 United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2 d Cir. 1966).
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dard than the "knowledge" requirement of the M'Naghten rule.39
Under the ALl rule, the ability to intellectually "know" that con-
duct is wrong is conjoined with an understanding of the moral and
legal significance of the conduct.
Some jurisdictions, such as Idaho, have rejected the
M'Naghten rule in favor of the ALI standard. In State v. White,4°
Janet White was charged with and acquitted of voluntary man-
slaughter based on an insanity defense. In the emergency room,
she told the doctors that the baby would not stop crying, her mind
had snapped, and she threw the baby on the ground.4' The main
issue at trial was the disagreement among the experts as to White's
sanity. Dr. Levy, testifying for the prosecution, concluded that
White's "snapping" was a rationalization for the killing and
doubted whether "she went into a psychotic depressive reaction.
because it would have had a longer duration. 42 However, Dr.
Levy admitted on cross-examination that throwing the baby on the
floor was a symptom of emotional illness.43
In contrast, Dr. Pullen, the defense doctor who treated the de-
fendant for three months at the state hospital where she was admit-
ted, testified that Mrs. White was suffering from acute schizophre-
nia. He stated that "mental illness of this type can long exist, sur-
face suddenly, and fade away." 44 The Idaho Supreme Court af-
firmed the acquittal.45 In its decision, the court declared that the
M'Naghten rule was outdated, of dubious judicial origin, and defi-
cient in several respects.46 The court adopted the American Law
Institute standard.47
Unfortunately, there are not many postpartum psychosis cases
from jurisdictions that have adopted the ALl standard. However,
the White decision supports the idea that a more flexible insanity
standard could facilitate successful insanity pleas for mothers suf-
fering from postpartum psychosis.
39 Waldron, supra note 8, at 690. See also John Dent, Postpartum Psychosis and the
Insanity Defense, 10 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 356-58 (1989) (discussing the movement away
from more lenient insanity standards following John Hinckley's acquittal by reason of insanity
for the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan).
40 456 P.2d 797 (Idaho 1969).
41 Id. at 798-99.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 799.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 801-02.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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B. The Problem of Evidence and Testimony
As a practical matter, postpartum psychosis is difficult to
prove, particularly when the mother has had no previous psychiat-
ric problems. 48 The temporary nature of the psychosis makes psy-
chiatric testing after the fact speculative as psychiatrists try to fig-
ure out the mother's mental conditions retrospectively. 49 An in-
creased sensitivity to the symptoms of serious depression and pos-
sible psychosis on the part of law enforcement could lead to psy-
chiatric testing that is more temporally proximate to the crime and
therefore more probative in an insanity defense.
Expert as well as acquaintance testimony is important to
prove this defense and to make the jury understand that a normally
loving person "just snapped." Unfortunately, the testimony of
family members can be difficult to gather because postpartum psy-
chosis and even severe depression seem to go unnoticed and undi-
agnosed.50 Abnormal behavior can be overlooked or attributed to
hormones and fatigue. As Dr. Dalton points out: "It is no good
asking a new mother if she has such fears [of harming her child],
as she will immediately refute the idea, knowing that if she con-
fesses her baby will be taken into care., 51 Those new mothers who
manifest symptoms while in the hospital usually are discharged
with the expectation that being at home in familiar surroundings
will alleviate the depression.52
In a study conducted in Ohio, a majority of the fifty-two
women who reported having emotional problems within the first
year of birth were not diagnosed formally by a doctor or psychia-
trist, despite having the required 5Periodic examination following
childbirth by their gynecologists.5 In fact, less than twenty per-
cent of the women even discussed the depression with their doctor
or pediatrician. 54 These statistics illustrate the difficulty of finding
doctors and family members to testify that they noticed something
amiss before the homicide. Without this crucial testimony, a post-
partum psychosis defense likely will fail.
48 For a discussion of the difficulties in proving the postpartum insanity defense, see Kat-
kin, supra note 4, at 282-94.
49 Dent, supra note 39, at 363.
50 Id.
51 DALTON, supra note 13, at 95.
52 Id. at 186.
53 TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 41.
54 Id.
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C. The Dearth of Medical Research and Study
The proof problem is further aggravated by the meager
amount of research and case studies on women suffering from
postpartum psychosis in the United States. The United Kingdom,
coincidentally one of the first countries to adopt an infanticide law,
has conducted the most studies and has special psychiatric units
where mentally ill mothers and their children can recover. This
is in contrast to the 1926 decision of the American Psychiatric As-
sociation and the American Medical Association, which eliminated
postpartum psychosis from the list of mental disorders because "no
distinct syndrome existed which showed a connection between a
psychiatric disorder and childbirth. 56
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM), the bible of U.S. psychiatric medicine, first recognized
postpartum psychosis in its fourth edition in 1994. 57 Prior to that
time, the DSM simply contained a cross-reference under "postpar-
tum psychosis" to see "schizophrenic disorder, brief reactive psy-
chosis, major affective disorders, [or] organic brain syndrome." 58
Michael O'Hara argues that the exclusion of postpartum psychosis
from the DSM impeded research in the U.S. because it was diffi-
cult to identify women who had just given birth and were receiving
psychiatric treatment.5 9 Dr. Brockington agrees that the influence
of the DSM on postpartum psychosis research "has been adverse"
and has made it more difficult to identify postpartum cases for epi-
demiological research.6 °
This lack of research can have important consequences at trial
or on appeal. For example, in the Comitz case, the Superior Court
was addressing whether the trial court erred by not excusing
55 O'Hara, supra note 9, at 220.
56 Anne Damante Brusca, Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for Murderous Moms?, 18
HOFSTRAL. REV. 1133, 1148 (1990).
57 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 386 (4"' ed. 1994) ("Infanticide is most often associated with postpar-
tum psychotic episodes that are characterized by command hallucinations to kill the infant or
delusions that the infant is possessed."); see also Junichi Nomura & Tadaharu Okano, Endo-
crine Function and Hormonal Treatment of Postpartum Psychosis, in POSTPARTUM PSYCHIAT-
RIC ILLNESS, supra note 4, at 176, 176 ("[T]he nosology and the etiology of postpartum psycho-
sis are not yet clear, and we have difficulty in finding its proper place in the modem classifica-
tion of mental diseases.").
58 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 491 (3d ed. 1980).
59 O'Hara, supra note 9, at 222 ("In the United States it is virtually impossible to link
obstetrical and psychiatric records as is routinely done in Europe."). See also BROCKINGTON,
supra note 26, at 208-09 ("The absence of the imprimatur of the World Health Organization and
the American Psychiatric Association has depressed research and the provision of services.").
60 BROCKINGTON, supra note 26, at 208.
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Comitz's behavior. 61 In light of the conflicting expert testimony as
to whether Comitz was psychotic at the time of the killing, the
court turned to the third edition of the DSM for definitions. At
that time, postpartum psychosis was listed as an "atypical dissocia-
tive disorder."62  In discounting the weight of the medical evi-
dence, the court stated that, "'atypical dissociative disorder' lacks
precise definition and, in fact, includes any one of several different
mental states. 63 The fact that postpartum psychosis had not been
defined or researched adequately led the court to question its valid-
ity and weakened the defendant's insanity argument.
Ill. THE COuRTS AND BIOLOGY: FEMINIST CONCERNS REGARDING
A FEMALE-SPECIFIC DEFENSE
A Wall Street Journal article lamented that Andrea Yates is
the "new feminine icon" and stated that from a legal standpoint
"the Yates case transcends gender."'64 Sally Satel argued that either
Andrea Yates was psychotic or she was not, and whether or not
she is male or female should make no difference. 65 However, it
should make a difference. The fact is that no man can suffer from
postpartum psychosis because no man can bear a child. While the
general principles of jurisprudence advocate a neutral application
of justice, to argue that the Yates case "transcends gender" is to
miss the basic point that Andrea Yates' defense depends upon a
female-specific psychiatric condition.
Whether to support legal standards that recognize, even in
some narrowly defined biological instances, differences between
men and women is controversial among feminists. For example,
some feminists favor maternity leave as the proper recognition of
women's special needs in the workplace, while others oppose sex-
specific leave policies because they recreate and perpetuate tradi-
tional stereotypes. 66 In the criminal law context, feminists debate
whether female-specific defenses such as the battered woman syn-
drome and postpartum psychosis advance or hinder women's
67rights.
61 Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
62 Id. at 478.
63 Id.
64 Sally Satel, The Newest Feminine Icon -A Killer Mom, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2001, at
A26.
65 Id.
66 Martha Minow, Adjudicating Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers, in CON-
FLICTS IN FEMINISM 149, 150 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990).
67 See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-14, 71-87 (1994)
(tracing the development of the battered woman syndrome defense, the research of its creator
Lenore Walker, and the reasons that the defense has overwhelmingly negative implications for
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A. The Sameness Theory
Assimilationist theory was the first feminist legal theory and
proposed that women and men should be treated exactly the same,
regardless of biological differences. 68 Assimilationist theory, also
known as the sameness approach or formal equality, evolved from
the Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Reed.69 In that case, the
Court held that Idaho could not deny women the right to adminis-
ter estates. Because there were no demonstrable differences be-
tween men and women, there was no justification for arbitrarily
treating the sexes differently. 70  Feminists seized on this decision
as an opportunity to show that in most cases, women were the
"same" as men so that discrimination could not be justified.7'
Today, sameness proponents argue that the best way to insure
that female differences are not used against women is to ignore the
differences as legally relevant.72 It is clear that sameness theory
has advanced women's causes, particularly in the employment
field.73 For example, in City of Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power v. Manhart,74 the Supreme Court held that the Depart-
ment's practice of having female employees pay 15% more in
monthly contributions to the retirement fund because of women's
longer life expectancy violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The Court stated that "[it is now well recognized that em-
ployment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped'
impressions about the characteristics of males or females. Myths
and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's ability to per-
form certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons" for
not employing qualified women.75
When the sameness doctrine attempts to deal with biological
differences such as pregnancy, there is a tension between the re-
women); Chimene I. Keitner, Victim or Vamp? Images of Violent Women in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 38 (2002) (studying the effect of sex stereotyping on
indictment, conviction, and sentencing of women).
68 See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Femi-
nist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 251-52 (1998).
69 404 U.S. 71(1971).
70 Id. at 76-77.
71 See Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, in FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 94, 94-95 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993).
72 Anne-Marie Leath Storey, An Analysis of the Doctrines and Goals of Feminist Legal
Theory and Their Constitutional Implications, 19 VT. L. REV. 137, 151 (1994).
73 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 35 (1987) (noting that while many women favor the sameness doc-
trine because it opened employment doors, the sameness doctrine also has advanced men's
interests in the area of child custody and divorce).
74 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
75 Id. at 707-08.
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sults and people's everyday experience with gender differences.
For example, in Gedulig v. Aiello,76 the Supreme Court examined
California's state-sponsored disability insurance system for private
employees. This program did not recognize normal pregnancy as a
covered disability.77 Four women brought a claim that this system
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court reasoned: "There is no risk from which men are
protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from
which women are protected and men are not.",78 Therefore, the
exclusion of normal pregnancies from coverage was not sex dis-
crimination but a classification based on a physical disability.
Reasoning that the insurance program did not exclude anyone
based on gender, the Court stated that "it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-
based classification., 79 The Court found no equal protection viola-
tion.
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,80 the Supreme Court exam-
ined a class action suit brought under Title VII challenging a dis-
ability plan similar to the one at issue in Gedulig. The Court held
that discrimination based on pregnancy is not sex discrimination
because the distinction being drawn was between pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. 8' Two years after Gedulig, the Court
seemed unwilling to reiterate the "pregnancy is not sex-based" ra-
tionale. Rather, the Court produced another tenuous distinction
between pregnant women and all other nonpregnant persons,
which, by definition, includes all men at all times. When con-
fronted with biological differences, the Court staunchly reasoned
to a gender-neutral conclusion, even though the results were a non-
sensical reflection of reality.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), an
amendment to Title VII, was Congress's response to the Court's
decisions in Gedulig and Gilbert.82 Although the Act was, in some
sense, a reaction to the sameness doctrine gone too far, the Act
exemplified the doctrine by treating pregnancy the same as any
other disability. The Act states that "women affected by preg-
76 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
77 Id. at 490.
78 Id. at 496-97.
79 Id. at 496 n.20.
- 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
81 Id. at 136-40. For further discussion of this decision, see JOYCE GELB & MARIAN LIEF
PALLEY, WOMEN AND PUBLIC POLICIES: REASSESSING GENDER POLITICS 163-68 (1996).
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). See also Leath Storey, supra note 72, at 169 (explaining
the legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act); GELB & LIEF PALLEY, supra note
81, at 162-74 (discussing the twenty-two-month process and debate to pass the Act).
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nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes. 83 Assimilationist ad-
vocate Wendy Williams notes that the PDA was passed in the con-
text of laws that forced pregnant women to resign or to lose ac-
crued seniority. 84 From that perspective, the PDA was improving
the treatment of women by mandating that they be treated the same
as others.
These cases illustrate the failure of the sameness doctrine to
deal adequately with biological differences between men and
women. By ignoring biology to remain consistent with its ideals,
•the sameness doctrine conflicts with reality. Sylvia A. Law points
out that "[t]his is a difference that is based in reality and not
'merely definitional."' 85 She adds that "an equality doctrine that
denies the reality of biological differences in relation to reproduc-
tion reflects an idea about personhood that is inconsistent with
people's actual experience of themselves and the world. 86  A
feminist theory that cannot accommodate relevant biological dif-
ferences within its doctrine, especially when women's lives are at
stake in a criminal trial, is not furthering the cause of women.
B. The Difference Theory
Criticism of the sameness doctrine led to the development of
other feminist theories. One of the perceived shortcomings of the
sameness doctrine is that in order to become equal, women have to
become like men, thereby sacrificing their womanhood.87 Cultural
feminism, or the difference approach, proposes that men and
women be treated equally, but that social, biological, and psycho-
logical differences be accommodated. This doctrine developed
from an effort to reconcile the demands of motherhood and preg-
nancy with the idea of formal equality. 88 Special rights and ac-
commodations for women affirm that men and women are differ-
ent and that those differences are properly reflected in the law. 89
Noted difference advocate Carol Gilligan writes that male and
female viewpoints differ and that there are cultural and biological
reasons for this. Her study showed that the maturation of boys and
girls led to different expectations and values based on gender. For
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
84 Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 14 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 151, 193-94 (1992).
85 Law, supra note 5, at 965.
86 Id. at 955.
87 Leath Storey, supra note 72, at 152-54.
88 See Grant Bowman & Schneider, supra note 68, at 251-54.
89 See Leath Storey, supra note 72, at 152.
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example, men tended to be concerned with hierarchy and power,
while women valued personal relationships and nurturing. Ac-
cording to Gilligan, trying to "equalize" these differences is irra-
tional. 91 The strength of this approach is that it does not require
women to "assimilate" to traditional male norms; the weakness is
that it may perpetuate traditional notions and limitations on
women's abilities. 92 As illustrated below, asserting difference in
the legal context has won some cases for women, but it also has
been employed against women.
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra,93 a receptionist for California Federal took maternity leave
and was subsequently discharged. The California Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Act required employers to provide leave and
reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy. 94 The Depart-
ment of Fair Employment and Housing charged California Federal
with violating state law, and California Federal brought an action
seeking Title VII preemption of the state claim.95
Feminist groups filed opposing briefs as to whether or not
women should be given "special" treatment for pregnancy. 96 The
Equal Rights Advocates argued that California's policy reflected
''real differences in the procreative roles of men and women,"
while the ACLU argued that pregnancy did not justify any special
treatment. 97 Although California Federal previously had a four-
month maternity leave policy, it argued that because the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act required the same treatment for pregnant
women as for others suffering from a disability, they could no
longer offer a special maternity leave.98
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, finding that the
Act established a floor below which no employer could go but did
not establish a ceiling.99 The California law was consistent with
the goals of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act because it helped
ensure that women would not lose their jobs as a consequence of
90 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 62 (1982).
91 Id. at 25.
92 Law, supra note 5, at 967-68.
93 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
94 Id. at 274.
95 Id.
96 Grant Bowman & Schneider, supra note 68, at 253.
97 Minow, supra note 66, at 151. See also Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The
Case of Pregnancy, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 71, at 27, 33-34 (discussing the
briefs filed by NOW and the equal rights groups).
98 479 U.S. at 284-92.
99 Id. at 290-92.
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pregnancy. 00 The Court stated that the California statute does not
"compel California employers to treat pregnant workers better than
other disabled employees; it merely establishes benefits that em-
ployers must, at a minimum, provide to pregnant workers."' 0 ' This
decision was considered a victory for difference feminists because
the Court upheld a policy that gave women a special benefit for
pregnancy. 102
In another case that pitted difference theorists against same-
ness theorists, two professors of women's history testified on op-
posing sides of an employment discrimination case. In Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,10 3 the
EEOC alleged that Sears was discriminating against women when
hiring for commission sales jobs. The main issue involved the ex-
planation for a gender disparity in the commission sales force." °4
The statistics of the gender disparity offered by the EEOC estab-
lished a prima facie case, and Sears used a women's historian to
explain that the disparity was a result of women's lack of interest
in the sales commission jobs rather than a result of Sears' dis-
criminatory hiring.
0 5
Sears' historian Rosalind Rosenberg argued that the inherent
differences in interests between men and women accounted for the
dearth of women in the sales positions. 06 Rosenberg testified that
"[m]any of the jobs that men and women perform in the labor
force today are modern equivalents of traditional men and women
tasks."' 0 7  She also testified that women generally prefer non-
commission sales jobs because they are less stressful and allow for
more social interaction. 10 8
The EEOC argued that the correct assumption was one of
equal interest. 10 9 EEOC historian Alice Kessler-Harris rebutted
Rosenberg's lack of interest argument. Kessler-Harris argued that
100 Id. at 288.
101 Id. at 291.
102 Leath Storey, supra note 72, at 157.
103 839 F.2d 302 (7"' Cir. 1988).
"04 Id. at 319-22.
105 Id. at 313.
106 EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1308 (N.D. 111. 1986), affid, 839
F.3d 302 (7t' Cir. 1988). For further discussion of Rosenberg's testimony, see Joan W. Scott,
Deconstructing Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Femi-
nism, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM, supra note 66, at 134, 138-42.
107 Alice Kessler-Harris, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck &
Company: A Personal Account, in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S
LIVES 594, 599 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996).
1os Sears 1, 628 F. Supp. at 1308. For further discussion, see Thomas Haskell & Sanford
Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX.
L. REV. 1629, 1634 (1988).
109 Sears 1, 628 F. Supp. at 1314.
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looking to history gave a distorted view of women's true interests
because employers and society routinely discriminated against
women, thereby creating the existing disparity. 110 Kessler-Harris
argued that "[t]o allow the tale told by Sears to pass unchallenged
as women's view of their history would encourage others to use it
to rationalize an unequal past.""' Kessler-Harris presented testi-
mony about women welders and crane operators during both
World Wars to illustrate that women cannot be presumed to have
traditional interests. The district court discounted this testimony
because it focused on "small groups of unusual women and their
demonstrated abilities ...and not on the majority of women or
their interests at the time of this case."" 
2
While going to lengths in a footnote to state that "few sweep-
ing generalities" can be made about men and women," 3 the district
court found that Sears proved that "men and women tend to have
different interests and aspirations," and that those differences ex-
plained the sales commission disparity. 14 The district court found
Rosenberg's testimony more convincing because "[s]he offered the
more reasonable conclusion that differences in the number of men
and women in a job could exist without discrimination by the em-
ployer." 115 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of Sears. 11
6
In the Sears decision, the courts found that an employment
disparity was more "reasonably" explained by inherent differences
in interest than by sex discrimination. This is the exact rationale
that the sameness proponents fear and exemplifies the danger cre-
ated by recognizing differences. The "lack of interest" argument
attributes women's preferences for traditionally female work to
social forces and biology rather than to workplace segregation.
17
It reinforces the notion that "[t]here is a natural order of gender
and work that even 'an Act of Congress' cannot overcome" and
that this is an obstacle to equality.
18
110 Id.
" Kessler-Harris, supra note 107, at 599.
112 Sears 1, 628 F. Supp. at 1313-14.
113 Id. at 1308 n.43.
14 Id. at 1305.
15 Id. at 1315.
116 EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 839 F.3d 302, 360 (7th Cir. 1988).
117 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARv. L. REV. 1749, 1759 (1990).
118 Id. (citing EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Okla. 1977)).
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Wendy Williams points out additional problems with special
treatment for women. 119 First, history has shown that special treat-
ment is a double-edged sword that can lead to both favorable and
unfavorable treatment. For example, she notes that prior to the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, special rules for pregnancy usually
meant that women were forced to quit or take a leave of absence
when they became pregnant. 120 Second, this special protection is
reserved for women while ignoring the inequities that other groups
suffer. Finally, Williams argues that women's freedom is actually
limited, rather than enhanced, when a state takes an interest in the
"well-being of the race."' 121 She fears that these types of policies
could lead to abortion restrictions and protection of fetuses, for
example. 22 These fears are not unfounded and hearken back to the
days of Muller v. Oregon,12 3 in which the Supreme Court affirmed
the right of the state to regulate women's working hours. The Su-
preme Court took judicial notice of the following: that "healthy
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring," that a woman's ma-
ternal functions place her at a disadvantage, and that it is important
to maintain the home. 124 Summarizing its rationale, the Court
stated that the reason for protecting women rests "in the inherent
difference between the two sexes, and in the different functions in
life which they perform."'
125
In relation to the postpartum psychosis defense, the sameness
theory would oppose any separate defense specifically for psy-
chotic mothers and would favor using current legal standards, in-
adequate as they are, to evaluate those cases. The difference theo-
rists might favor a separate defense for mothers, with the risk that
women would be presumed crazy and out of control due to pre-
menstrual syndrome and pregnancy in addition to postpartum psy-
chosis. Neither approach offers an analytical framework condu-
cive to meeting the needs of women and the needs of the justice
system. The cases discussed above indicate that the courts are
willing to struggle with equality. The cases also indicate that the
sameness and difference discussion has surpassed its utility by
failing to solve the dilemma presented by biological distinctions.
Part IV presents a new framework with which an equality discus-
119 Williams, supra note 84, at 170.
120 Id. at 168.
121 Id. at 170.
122 Id.
1- 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
12 Id. at419-22.
125 Id. at 423.
[Vol. 53:143
POSTPARTUM PSYCHOSIS DEFENSE
sion could move forward and recognize a gender-specific defense
such as postpartum psychosis.
IV. ARRIVING AT EQUALITY AND JUSTICE FOR MOTHERS WHO KILL
Judges and appellate courts have realized in some cases that a
jury was unable to understand the psychiatric evidence or was too
overcome by horror to form a proper verdict for a mother who
killed a helpless child. For example, in Gambill v. State,'26 the
defendant was found guilty but mentally ill for drowning her five-
year-old son. Prior to the killing, she had religious visions and
accused her friends of being devils. After she killed her son, she
believed that she was with Jesus and approached a stranger com-
pletely naked. 127 On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed
the verdict but reduced the sentence from sixty to forty years.
28
The court noted that there was "overwhelming testimony that the
Appellant was gravely mentally ill 'at the time of the drowning....
All of the experts testified to the diagnosis of paranoid schizophre-
nia." 1
29
More dramatically, in People v. Massip,130 the trial judge set
aside the jury's finding of sanity. In that case, there was testimony
that the mother had suicidal thoughts and hallucinations. Believ-
ing that she was tired, she went to her mother's for the weekend,
and her obstetrician prescribed tranquilizers.' 3' Two days later,
she took her son for a walk and threw him in front of an oncoming
car. The car swerved, and the baby was spared. Later that day, the
mother placed her son under the wheels of her car and ran him
over. She placed him in a trashcan and reported him kidnapped.
32
She later stated that she saw her son as a doll and not as a person.
Sheryl Massip was found sane and convicted by the jury of sec-
ond-degree murder. In a controversial decision, the trial judge re-
duced the jury's verdict to voluntary manslaughter and set aside
the finding of sanity.' 33 The decision was affirmed on appeal. 1
34
These are two examples of cases in which a judge or appellate
court recognized the weight of the psychiatric evaluations and the
testimony of acquaintances. As Part II illustrated, however, deci-
126 675 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. 1996).
127 Id. at 678.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 271 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
131 Id. at 869.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 id. at 876.
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sions for postpartum psychosis are not uniform, consistent, or, in
many cases, just. The current insanity standards do not meet the
needs of the women suffering from postpartum psychosis, and al-
though courts are willing to overrule juries, this judicial activism
is not a dependable solution to the problem. While the goal is not
to have all mothers acquitted, the sentences and verdicts should
reflect the fact that in most cases there is definite evidence of
grave mental illness.
A. A Legislative Proposal
A different legal insanity standard for a mother who kills her
child is an appropriate solution to meet the demands of equality
and justice. From the equality view, it would allow women to
have equal justice because women would be judged against a stan-
dard created for them for a condition that is specific to them.
Gender neutrality cannot be invoked in the law when the biological
reality is that genders are different and when that biological reality
is relevant. Remembering that the deterrence and retributive goals
of the criminal justice system are meaningless when directed
against those who cannot control their conduct,135 the justice ad-
vantage is that fewer women would be sent to jail for crimes com-
mitted under circumstances that raise serious questions as to their
sanity.
The following standard would make postpartum psychosis a
viable insanity defense:
1. Affirmative defense: The defendant can raise the af-
firmative defense of insanity based on postpartum psychosis
if:
a.) the killing of the defendant's child occurred within
one year of the mother giving birth to that child or an-
other child, and
b.) an expert psychiatrist appointed by the court deter-
mines that there is a reasonable doubt as to the defen-
dant's sanity.
2. Elements: The defendant must prove, to the extent de-
termined by state law, that:
a.) she was suffering from postpartum psychosis, and
b.) there was a causal connection between the psychosis
and the killing, and
c.) she did not know right from wrong, or, if she did
know right from wrong, then she must prove that because
135 Waldron, supra note 8, at 679.
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of the psychosis, she had lost the ability to choose be-
tween right and wrong.
This standard is a modification of the Irresistible Impulse
Test, an insanity rule created after M'Naghten to address cases in
which a person committed a crime while in a delusional state.'
36
The Irresistible Impulse Test is a workable and appropriate stan-
dard from which to form a postpartum psychosis standard because
in almost every postpartum case, the mother stated that she was
hearing voices, being commanded by God, or hallucinating. The
standard is not overly broad; it will force the defendant to prove
insanity to a legal standard in order to be acquitted.
The new rule creates a procedure which requires an unbiased
psychiatric opinion before the defense can be raised.1 37 The de-
fense can also only be invoked if the killing took place during a
twelve-month postpartum period. This temporal proximity re-
quirement is consistent with the idea that childbirth and the onset
of psychosis are interrelated.
After meeting the initial requirements, the defendant must
convince the jury that she was psychotic, that the crime and the
psychosis were connected, and that she either did not know right
from wrong or that if she did, that she could not control herself.
These elements must be proven to the standard set by state law.
As noted in Finger v. Nevada, 38 the state can make the defense
more or less restrictive based on its burden of proof standard. The
most restrictive method would be to have the defendant prove in-
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, while the least restrictive would
require that she prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
A legislative solution is not unprecedented. England, Canada,
and Australia have infanticide provisions that reduce murder to
manslaughter if the mother kills the child within one year of birth.
Australia's Infanticide Act of 1922 covers children under one year
and assumes that a woman's mind is disturbed by childbirth and
lactation. 139 England's Infanticide Act of 1938, an amendment to
the original act of 1922, assumes that a woman who kills her infant
within the first year of its life has not recovered from giving birth
136 For further discussion of the Irresistible Impulse Test, see the early case of Parson v.
State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887). See also Hawkins-Leon, supra note 23, at 393-95.
137 See also FED. R. EvID. 706 (allowing court-appointed experts in federal court). Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Black, proposed the idea of a "standing disinterested expert
agency" in his dissent from Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 804 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). The majority held that requiring a defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt did not violate his due process rights.
138 27 P.3d 66, 73 (Nev. 2001).
139 McSherry, supra note 21, at 304.
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and reduces the charge to infanticide or manslaughter. 14 The law
does not require any causal connection between the disorder and
the crime, so that it practically constitutes a per se defense to any
killing that occurs within one year of birth.14' While a per se de-
fense with no causal requirement may seem extreme, these statutes
nonetheless indicate that countries with respectable legal systems
are recognizing postpartum psychosis defenses.
It is also not unprecedented to establish a gender-specific
standard within legislation. Employment law provided the catalyst
for courts to use a "reasonable woman standard" in Title VII sex-
ual harassment cases. For example, in Ellison v. Brady,142 the
court used a "reasonable woman" test to determine whether the
sexually harassing behavior of a co-worker was severe and perva-
sive enough to meet the requirements of the Title VII prima facie
case. The court stated that by using a "reasonable person" stan-
dard, the court "run[s] the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level
of discrimination. Harassers could continue to harass merely be-
cause a particular discriminatory practice was common."' 143 The
court realized that using a "reasonable person" standard could in-
stitutionalize already existing harassment.
In the criminal law area, the Supreme Court of Washington
held that a jury instruction that set forward an objective standard
using the pronoun "he" in a self-defense case violated the female
defendant's right to equal protection. 144 The court emphasized that
by persistently using the masculine gender and a reasonable person
standard, the instruction mandated that the jury judge the petite
female defendant with a broken leg who stabbed a 6'4" intoxicated
male by a standard that did not afford her the same protection that
a male defendant would have under the same circumstances. The
court stated that the female defendant's actions must be judged "in
light of her own perceptions of the situation" because to do other-
wise would be to deprive her of equal protection. 145These cases indicate that women's perspectives are gradually
being incorporated into the law as courts recognize that the statutes
often reflect a masculine viewpoint. In that context, a statutory
insanity defense incorporating a female-specific medical condition
should be attainable.
140 Waldron, supra note 8, at 679. See also Dent, supra note 39, at 356-58.
141 Waldron, supra note 8, at 679.
142 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
143 Id. at 878. See also Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623-28 (6th Cir.
1987) (Keith, J., dissenting).
144 State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. 1977).
145 Id.
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B. Response to Criticisms
Before responding to criticisms leveled against this type of
gender-specific defense, it is necessary to dispel a common myth
that those acquitted by reason of insanity are released immediately.
This is simply not the case. In most states, statutes provide that an
acquittee be committed to a mental institution upon conclusion of
the case. t46 In some instances, the period of time in the mental in-
stitution will, in fact, be longer than the potential jail term. In
Jones v. United States,147 the defendant proved his insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence to be acquitted of petit larceny
charges. The maximum jail time was one year. After his acquittal,
he was committed to a mental institution for an indefinite period of
time. The Supreme Court rejected his argument that there is any
correlation between the potential length of a prison sentence and
the period of time spent in a mental institution. The Court stated
clearly that the "purpose of commitment following an insanity ac-
quittal ... is to treat the individual's mental illness and to protect
him and society from his potential dangerousness. The committed
acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or
is no longer dangerous."' 149 Therefore, even those women who are
acquitted under a postpartum psychosis defense will be in a mental
institution until they can convince the review board that they are
sane.
Political will is also a requirement for any new legislation.
Politicians overwhelmingly focus on the community reaction to
insanity defense legislation, discounting or ignoring the practical
and theoretical implications. 150 State legislatures have passed laws
imposing the death penalty for murdering a child but have not cre-
ated a statute for a postpartum psychosis defense, perhaps due to
the incomplete medical studies or the public attention that accom-
panies these murders. 151 However, if legislators seriously investi-
gated the postpartum psychosis defense, they might find more pub-
lic sympathy than expected and encourage in-depth medical re-
search. The trend in state legislatures since United States v.
146 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1)(2001); see also State v. March, No.
CR1866304, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1140 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2001) (refusing to
release a mother from a mental institution ten years after she drowned her son).
147 463 U.S. 354, 360 (1983).
148 Id. at 369.
149 Id. at 368.
150 Hawkins-Leon, supra note 23, at 407.
151 Barton, supra note 22, at 608-10 (noting that Texas, New Jersey, and Mississippi have
imposed the death sentence on defendants for killing children).
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Hinckley152 has been to either eliminate the insanity defense en-
tirely or to modify it to a guilty but mentally ill standard. 153 Per-
haps the Yates case, which has also captured the nation's attention,
will reverse this trend.
Some feel that a gender-specific defense will "discriminate
against men, who cannot bear children but suffer equally the ef-
fects of post-birth stress.' 5 4  However, this defense discriminates
against men only to the same extent that nature discriminates
against men by not allowing them to bear children. By definition
and by epidemiological studies, postpartum psychosis has a clear
temporal connection with childbirth. All people are vulnerable to
a mental illness, but women are more vulnerable following child-
birth than the rest of the population is throughout life, even after
accounting for significant triggering events such as physical illness
and adverse life occurrences. A study conducted in Manchester,
England showed that admissions to the psychiatric ward for post-
partum psychiatric problems were eighteen times greater than ad-
missions at non-postpartum times. 55 While many fathers share in
the post-birth stress of a newborn infant, the medical fact remains
that they cannot suffer from postpartum psychosis.
Some feminists, including Wendy Williams, argue that by
"insisting upon our differences at these crucial junctures, [we are]
promot[ing] and reinforc[ing] the us-them dichotomy that permits
[judges] to resolve matters of great importance and complexity by
the simplistic, reflexive assertion that women and men are 'simply
not similarly situated."",056 These are legitimate concerns, particu-
larly from the sameness feminists' point of view. However, as
discussed in Part III, the sameness theory offers no adequate
method for addressing biological differences between men and
women. Ignoring biological realities that are putting women be-
hind bars cannot be justified in the name of equality. This is a
complex issue, but allowing juries to have a "knee jerk" reaction
when confronted with the culturally distasteful fact of a mother
152 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C.), affd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding Hinckley not
guilty by reason of insanity for attempted assassination of President Reagan).
1 See, e.g., Damante Brusca, supra note 56, at 1156. The guilty but mentally ill standard
is an alternative verdict to not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty. In most states, it means that
the defendant is sentenced as any other guilty party but is given special psychiatric treatment
while in prison. For further discussion of the guilty but mentally ill verdict, see Christopher
Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494 (1985). For a discussion of why eliminating the insanity standard
may be considered unconstitutional, see Finger v. Nevada, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
'54 Barton, supra note 22, at 617.
155 BROCKINGTON, supra note 26, at 222.
156 Williams, supra note 84, at 164.
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killing her children is no more justified than ignoring the biologi-
cal differences completely.
Patricia Pearson argues that special treatment for women, be
that in the American battered woman syndrome or the British in-
fanticide defense, will result in fewer rights for women. 157 She
believes that "accommodat[ing] a collective sense that women
should be treated lightly for certain crimes" will be used as an ex-
cuse to trample women's rights. 158 She notes the example that
"[p]ostpartum psychosis was widely used in the nineteenth century
in England as a reason why women shouldn't vote.''
159
To suggest that defendant mothers will be treated "lightly" is
the exact type of statement that creates what Catharine MacKinnon
calls "law-and-society's hall of mirrors where sex equality law
remains otherwise trapped."1 60 If the current standard by which
women are being judged is resulting in injustice, then correcting
that standard does not mean that women are treated more leniently
than men. It means that they are treated equally. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Ellison, a
"reasonable woman" standard does not grant a higher level of pro-
tection; it merely puts women on "equal footing with men.' 16' Re-
garding Pearson's "trampling the rights" concern, it is an oversim-
plification to compare voting rights to a woman facing capital pun-
ishment. Pearson's argument leads to the conclusion that same-
ness advocates will insist on "equality" at the expense of women's
liberty. It is difficult to imagine a greater "trampling of rights"
than to be convicted of murder because the insanity standard was
unfair.
In his article dealing with the insanity defense, John Dent
suggests lowering the standard of proof required when postpartum
psychosis is claimed. 162 He proposes that, because of the difficul-
ties in proving postpartum psychosis, the defendant should only be
required to raise a reasonable doubt as to her sanity. This was in
contrast to the majority of jurisdictions that require the defendant
to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear
and convincing evidence.
157 PATRICIA PEARSON, WHEN SHE WAS BAD: VIOLENT WOMEN AND THE MYTH OF IN-
NOCENCE 91 (1997).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in FEMINIST JURISPRU-
DENCE, supra note 71, at 610, 613.
161 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
162 Dent, supra note 39, at 367-68.
163 Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (making the existence of severe mental disease or
defect an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant by clear and convincing evidence
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While this idea sounds enticing, it is too close to simply "low-
ering the bar" for women to give them easier access to the insanity
plea and is inconsistent with the idea that women do not have to
work within already existing structures to achieve equality. "Low-
ering the bar" is a quick solution that does not address the underly-
ing issues of the feminist debate. A legislative solution is prefer-
able because it serves a three-fold purpose.. First, on the practical
level, it moves the insanity defense into the realm of realistic pos-
sibilities for mothers who kill their children. Second, on the po-
litical level, it increases public awareness and encourages medical
research. Finally, on the theoretical level, it helps to move the dis-
cussion of women's rights beyond the sameness and difference
debate.
CONCLUSION
A female-specific defense grounded in a biological difference
is consistent with the idea first proffered by Catharine MacKinnon
in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law, 164 in which
she disagrees with measuring women's equality against a norm
that has been established by men. She argues that sex equality
cannot be defined for women by a male point of view in an already
existing social reality. 165 The insanity defenses under which men
are judged do not have to be the norm, and women do not have to
be seen as seeking "special" treatment. Rather, the proper ap-
proach is to argue that the legal system is recognizing reality and
creating a gender-specific defense that relies on conditions that are
biologically applicable to only one gender: "These defenses rec-
ognize that gender is one of the few distinguishing characteristics
in the criminal law that allows some individuals to have defenses
that other could never have.' 66 The postpartum psychosis defense
is not unequal to men, because men do not bear children or the
concomitant risk of mental illness.
Arguing that the dichotomous approach of sameness versus
difference forces women into the no-win situation of either reject-
ing difference or recognizing it at the expense of equality, Joan
Scott posits the question: "What are the relevant categorical dif-
and also being known as the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790, 800-01 (1952) (holding that it is not a violation of due process for Oregon to require that
the defendant prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
164 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Not by Law Alone, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 73,
at 22.
165 MacKinnon, supra note 160, at 610, 613.
166 Deborah W. Denno, Gender Issues and the Criminal Law: Gender, Crime and the
Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80, 125 (1994).
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ferences? 167 If anything should be recognized as a difference, it
should be pregnancy and conditions related to it, a fundamental
biological difference unrelated to social status or power structures.
It is possible to recognize that pregnancy is the touchstone of
women's separateness and that boundaries drawn along the line of
pregnancy and related conditions, including postpartum psychosis,
are not a step backward for the feminist movement but a step for-
ward to a clearer strategy for advancement.
MICHELE CONNELL
t
167 Scott, supra note 106, at 143.
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